

calling of a people's convention; in a separate telegram he also pleaded for the granting of amnesties to all political offenders in the eyes of Nanking, with the exception of Generals Yen Hsi-shan and Chen Chun-ming.

It has been succinctly stated that wars are but a form of political election in China. If we correctly interpret the spirit of General Chiang's above two telegrams there seems to be eager desire on his part to demonstrate the utility or rather futility of civil fighting in this respect. We certainly hope with him that the measures he proposed will be faithfully executed to explore a common-meeting ground for able spokesmen of all political viewpoints. It is only through a conscientious process aimed at the adjustment and harmonization of all viewpoints, and not by the trial of military strength, that a political system may be evolved in China for the sake of lasting peace in the country. To our mind this must be the first urgent post-war task confronting the government. The two telegrams of General Chiang mentioned above would seem to indicate that a lesson has been learned from the war just concluded.

Of course there is a number of other post-war problems. In a manifesto to the people on the eve of the National Anniversary General Chiang discusses them under headings with much directness and simplicity. He enumerates five tasks as of immediate urgency; namely, the complete eradication of communism and banditry, the rehabilitation of the national finances, evolution of an efficient and irreproachable administration, development of productive enterprises, and enforcement of local autonomy throughout the country. We agree with the General that of these five bandit suppression "must naturally receive first attention" from the Government. "As soon as the war is over," he states, "the Government must assume full responsibility for the planning as well as rigorous prosecution of the bandit-suppression campaign. . . . Within three months, or at most six months, from the conclusion of the military expedition, complete eradication of banditry should be effected."

As regards national finances, General Chiang emphasizes once more what has been the hope of the entire country. The reforms he stresses are the introduction of budgetary, accounting and auditing systems, the unification of currency and the abolition of *likin* and other

transit duties. "With peace and national unification restored," General Chiang pledges, "not only will these vitally important requirements be rigidly enforced, but strict publicity of all national and local government accounts will also be introduced." It is to be hoped that the execution of this pledge will open a new page in the history of government finances in China.

On the subject of government administration General Chiang makes some pointed remarks that remind us of his strong rebuke of Chinese officialdom in his last New Year manifesto to the people (*China Critic* Vol. III No. 2). To quote General Chiang: "The main defects of the officialdom today are (1) lethargy and inefficiency; and (2) corruption. The former is due to ambiguous demarcation of the powers and responsibilities of the various officials; and the latter is attributable to the fact that evil practices long chronic in the body politic can not be wiped out at once. This has been a disappointment to the people and a blot on the National Revolution. The administrative system must therefore be revised and improved; and political responsibility clearly defined so that the line of demarcation between the jurisdictions of various Government organs will be clear and indisputable. The system of supervision and impeachment of Government officials guilty of corruption will be vigorously enforced in order to eradicate corruption in officialdom."

To facilitate economic development of China, General Chiang is in favor of the employment of foreign capital. But he adds that foreign capital must be invited on honorable terms and it must be strictly used for the development of means of communications, water conservancy, development of agriculture and mining, and protection of other basic industries of the country.

As regards enforcement of local autonomy, the General deplors that the results which have so far been achieved are far from satisfactory. "With the liquidation of the rebellion," he promises, "efforts must be concentrated on the enforcement of this all-important system so that the Period of Tutelage may be completed and the way to constitutional government opened."

The above tasks, General Chiang concludes, are the minimum requirement of the government. "Only when it succeeds in their realization, will it have carried out its primary duties to the people." We certainly concur in this.

## The Chinese Republic Enters her Twentieth Year

The autumn sun shone pleasant and warm on Friday, October 10. It saw hundreds of people, and thousands more throughout the country, join in nationwide celebrations of the nineteenth anniversary of the inauguration of the Chinese Republic. It smiled at the flag-bedecked city and seemed to say, "A fine day befitting a great occasion!" It was indeed a fine day worthy of its event. Nature had purposely made it so—as if it, too, was happy over the fact that the Chinese Republic is entering her twentieth year.

The history of the past nineteen years, however, has not been altogether a smooth one. The eighteen October 10's have witnessed the country in a worse plight than the nineteenth. On October 10, 1911, the first call of the Revolutionists was sounded at Wuchang, and was heard and answered throughout the country. The Manchus were overthrown, and the people, long under monarchy's yoke, rose up and hailed the revolutionary sign as godsend. But no sooner had the monarchy's yoke been discarded, than the mantle of militarism

was put in its place. *The China Times*, in its issue of Oct. 10 briefly summarizes the happenings during the next seventeen autumns (a selection of which is printed in this issue under "Press Comments") Because of the conciseness of the resumé we do not hesitate to quote it here at some length:

"2nd Year.—Failure of the Second Revolution. Yuan Shih-kai assumed the substantive office of President. He did everything according to his own inclinations. People doubted his loyalty to Republicanism. As his rebellious deeds could not yet be proved, he was left alone. Yuan was enjoying the proudest moment of his life then.

"3rd Year.—The Provisional Constitutional Law became a dead letter. The Cabinet was renamed the Chen Shih Tang or The Hall of State Affairs. Yuan appointed his own satellites to be Tutah and civil Governors of the provinces. People grumbled everywhere; and not a vestige or republican atmosphere was noticeable in this country.

"4th Year.—The Sh'ou An Hui or the Society to Safeguard Peace was created; but its real purpose was to promote Yuan's scheme of monarchy. The inspection of troops and the holding of banquets were stopped on the National Festival Day.

"5th Year.—Although Yuan Shih-kai had died, the military and civil governors of the provinces were still mostly militarists and mandarins. Conflicting views were held among Kuomintang members regarding the restoration of the Parliament and the reapplication of the Provisional Constitutional Law. Party opinions were regarded contemptuously by both officials and commoners.

"6th Year.—Following upon the failure of the attempt to reinstate the Manchu Emperor, the Peiping Faction seized the reign of government. The north and the south split on account of their quarrel about the Provisional Constitutional Law. The late Dr. Sun Yat-sen, in his capacity as Generalissimo, issued an order in Canton for the punishment of Feng Kuo-chang and Tuan Chi-ji.

"7th Year.—The New Parliament elected Hsu Shih-chang to the Presidency. Hsu assumed office on the Double-Tenth anniversary. But on the preceding day (October 9), the Military Government of Canton issued a circular notice, informing the Nation that it was exercising the function and power of the Cabinet and acting as Regent in the discharge of the duties of the President.

"8th Year.—The Anfu Clique (the Anhui section of the Peiyang Party, led by Tuan Chi-ji) held the power of government. Chihli (headed by Tsao Kun) and Anhui struggled for supremacy.

"9th Year.—An alliance was effected between Chihli and Fengtien (Manchuria). The Anfu faction was defeated. Dissensions broke out also in the south.

"10th Year.—The whole country became disturbed. Chang Shao-tsen advocated the holding of a conference

at Lushan (Kulin). Tsao Kun, Chang Tso-lin and Wu Pei-fu separately sent circular telegrams on the Double-Tenth Anniversary in support of this suggestion.

"11th Year.—President Li Yuan-hung resumed office. The Old Parliament was reinstated. Party strife was as rife as ever. Chihli and Fengtien indulged in mutual recriminations.

"12th Year.—Tsao Kun was elected President by means of bribery. He assumed the Presidency on October 10, or the Double-Tenth Festival Day in face of strong opposition by the south and the Fengtien Faction.

"13th Year.—War opened between Chihli and Fengtien. Chi Hsieh-yuan and Lu Yung-hsiang fought and devastated Kiangsu and Chekiang.

"14th Year.—The influence of the Fengtien Army extended as far as the Yangtze River regions. Tuan Chi-ji became the Provisional Chief Executive. Sun Chuan-fang taking advantage of his tour of military inspection on the Double-Tenth Festival Day, decided to declare himself against Fengtien.

"15th Year.—The Military Government at Canton appointed Chiang Kai-shek Commander-in-Chief of the Revolutionary Army on a punitive expedition against Hupeh; and civil war was inevitable.

"16th Year.—The National Government was established at Nanking. Shansi and Honan rose against Fengtien. Nanking and Hankow were at loggerheads.

"17th Year.—The Northern Punitive Expedition was successfully concluded; but Pei Chung-hsi and Yang Yu-ting acted in a strange manner in the vicinity of Luanchow, giving rise to wild rumors.

"18th Year.—The National Government was tolerably well-organized. But Feng Yu-hsiang rebelled, whereupon Commander-in-Chief Chiang himself proceeded to the regions along the Pei-ping-Hankow Railway to suppress the revolt."

Thus passed China in the nineteen years of her republican life. But Oct. 10, 1930 sees a better day. The Northern Coalition is well on its way to dissolution. Early peace is now expected. Can we hope—as we have always hoped—that in the future no military campaigns will "have to" be undertaken.

The significance of celebrating the national anniversary, however, is not so much the mere consciousness on the part of the populace of the existence of the nation. The proclamation of a national holiday must go hand in hand with educating the general public as to the history of the holiday. In other words, the average man must be taught why there should be a national holiday at all. Outward conformity is merely a matter of procedure. Intelligence demands a better appreciation of an event as important as the anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Republic.

The first year's work, therefore, needs an investment of nine million dollars. If this is successful and these factories are put on a profitable basis, future development will be extremely easy.

An investment of ten million dollars a year is by no means too much. For even if we can continue to invest at this rate for twenty-five years, we still have to buy foreign sugar. It is clear therefore that the work

ahead of us is enormously big. We only hope that this humble beginning may lead to a more extensive program in the future.

The sugar tax is not a cruel tax. It is taken mostly from the rich, as the poorer people do not use much sugar. And inasmuch as the tax is used to assure livelihood of millions of farmers and laborers, this program has a profound significance for the rural as well as industrial welfare of the country.

## Militarism vs. Democracy

BY CHIN-JEN CHEN (陳欽仁)

For many months the military chieftains of China have been cutting one another's throat. Such internecine strifes have always been called "civil wars"; but the term "civil war," strictly speaking, is in most instances a misnomer. The present war between the so-called "North" and "South," for example, is "civil" to the extent that it is a war between different factions of military commanders belonging to the same nationality. But it is not "civil" in the sense that it involves clear-cut issues in which the Chinese people as a whole take a vital interest and which, in their opinion, warrant such wanton destruction of life and property as has been going on.

The terms "North" and "South," indeed, are most misleading. Geographically one may, for various reasons, divide a country into as many sections as he pleases. Anthropologists, for instance, may divide China into "North" and "South" and tell us that the people of these two sections show marked differences in their bodily structure and their modes of life. Such differences, however, notwithstanding their scientific significance, can in no way lead to political differences and still less cause the Chinese people to desire the setting-up of separate political states.

Whether or not a people can live peacefully under one government depends upon whether or not they are willing to do so. In the case of the Chinese people, their willingness is beyond all doubt. Historically speaking, it was largely this willingness to live under one government that made it possible for past conquerors to unify the country and found dynasties which lasted for centuries. Today, no matter where one goes, he will not find the least evidence to show that any section of the Chinese people desire to secede from the rest of their countrymen. The educated classes earnestly hope for a government that will, through constructive work, devote its entire energy to labor for the welfare of the country and thereby raise China's international status. The illiterate masses, though taking little interest in national politics and world affairs, at least desire to be let alone so that they may plough or trade in peace.

But their military leaders will not let them alone and will not give them peace. Fratricidal wars have

been harassing the country ever since the founding of the Republic. China, truth to tell, is a republic in name only. Anarchy, plainly speaking, is the order of the day, and militarism remains the perpetual scourge. Militarists come and go; but militarists, past and present, are birds of a feather. They all have, with very few exceptions, enriched themselves at the expense of the people, who have invariably been the sole sufferers. But our distinguished generals are no less skilled in the art of propaganda than in the art of slaughtering their countrymen. The so-called "civil wars" are always accompanied by telegrams and declarations in which each denounces the other and sets forth his own high-sounding principles. Their principles, however, have too often been belied by their actions, so that nowadays political shibboleths are no longer taken seriously by the thinking Chinese.

Far be it from us to assert that our military leaders are downright hypocrites. Some of them are undoubtedly sincere in their declarations of principles. Notwithstanding facts to the contrary, we will even go so far as to concede that all of them are sincere. Let it be taken for granted that they all have good intentions. But "good intentions" alone can get them nowhere. A five-year-old child who goes into the kitchen with perfectly good intentions to "cook supper for papa" may set the house on fire. In like manner have China's military leaders been unwittingly keeping the country in turmoil for nineteen long years. Good intentions, indeed, must be coupled with knowledge—knowledge as to how to translate those intentions into actualities. When good intentions are merely accompanied by ignorance, the results are most likely to be disastrous.

Ignorance, therefore, lies at the root of China's troubles. Never has it been truer than now that knowledge is power. For nearly two decades our military leaders have been groping in the dark. They are still blundering along. We laugh at their futile efforts. We condemn their crude methods. Yet we cannot blame them too much. They seem to be anxious to work for the good of the country. They may mean well. But the painful truth is that they do not know how to proceed! China is a large country. To bring about her unification and elevate her to a plane of equality with the great powers is a Herculean task, the accomplishment